Latest Trends in Financial Management and Financial services by Demudu Babu, P
International Journal of Science Engineering and Advance Technology,IJSEAT, Vol 3, Issue 9, SEPTEMBER - 2015 ISSN 2321-6905
www.ijseat.com Page 434
Latest Trends in Financial Management and Financial services
P.Demudu Babu
Assistant Professor-MBA
Indo American Institutions Technical Campus
demudubabu@iaitc.in
Abstract:
The financing and financial services are fast
moving from year to year due to the current issues
in the economy which have a direct relation with
the latest technology, political and regulatory
authority. Financial institutions are competing to
provide fast services at low interest rates in relation
to the quality of assets. Non-banking institutions
are aggressive in providing financial services with
innovative strategies, while trying to minimize the
risk rate.
Full digital banking and mobile banking are
providing flexibility, adaptability, integration and
efficiency. Market niches have to be addressed with
different strategies. Technology is being used in the
financial markets, the availability of skilled
manpower to address the issues related therein is a
challenge for the financial institutions.
Daily finance and micro finance are playing a vital
role in the Indian economy which does not have a
regulating authority.  These fulfill the immediate
financial requirement of petty businesses which are
not in the purview of the government or the
regulatory body.. Large banks do not have the ease
of providing finance because of the complex
procedures, rules and regulations within which
banks have to function. There exists a wide gap
between sect oral financial requirements that needs
to be addressed by the Government with public
private partnership. The transparency in
maintaining and sharing the relevant data with the
help of emerging technologies will lead to healthy
financial markets.
While some banks are trying to deal with historic
loses reflected in their balance sheets.  The aim of
the study is to explore the business activities of
banks with a special focus on their lending
behavior and responsiveness to unconventional
monetary policy. Deleveraging has been mainly via
market to market assets falling in value and policy
is now serving to reflate these assets without a
strong impact on lending. . A study shows that
GSIFI banks are least responsive to policy. Non
GSIFI banks respond to the lending rates spread to
cash rates, the spread between lending rates and the
alternative investment in Government bonds, and
the distance to default ( the bank’s solvency). The
study would show that better lending in the US is a
result of safer banks and a better spread to govt.
bongs – yields on the later are too attractive relative
to lending rates in Europe. Finally, the paper
comments on the problem of using cyclical tools to
address structural problems in banks and suggests
Which alternative policies would better facilitate A
FINANCIAL SYSTEM MORE aligned with
lending.
Keywords: bank; transition; reform; financial
system; deregulation; consolidation; financial
trends
I. Introduction
Imagine two very different financial market
structures. The first has many suppliers, each with
only a small share of the market. The second has a
few very large firms that supply most of the
market, plus many smaller players that make up the
rest. Which structure is more stable: the one with
many small firms or the concentrated market where
a few firms dominate? Which structure best
describes financial markets in the United States?
Those are questions we address in this article.1 A
stable market is one that can endure shocks to
supply or demand without collapsing—that is,
without experiencing surging (or wildly oscillating)
prices or sharply shrinking volumes. Stability
requires certain self-correcting tendencies that
ensure that a market can right itself. If supply falls
because a major producer fails, for example, the
resulting excess demand must push prices upward.
Rising prices, in turn, must induce prompt
substitution toward other suppliers or products.
Substitution tends to dampen upward pressure on
prices, thus stabilizing the market.
The financial sector has been cautious - sometimes
resistant
- when dealing with the relentless change and
uncertainty brought on by the digital age. But
consumer need and behaviour is changing the
industry’s landscape.
• In the UK, people are using their smartphones for
over 41 hours a month, accessing them an average
of nine times a day.1
• 14.7 million banking apps have been downloaded
.2
• £1.7 billion is transferred each week via mobile
banking apps.3
• Spending on contactless cards trebled in 2014,
reaching a record £2.32 billion.4
In this report, we’ve highlighted the trends that are
shaping the financial industry. These are the trends
you need to act on now; the trends you need to
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analyse to understand their imminent impact; and
the future trends you need to be aware of.
II. The Ambiguous Link between Concentration
and Stability
Why should a change in concentration affect either
the probability of a firm’s distress or the severity of
the consequent market disruption? In this section,
we review theory and empirical evidence that
address this question. History certainly suggests a
link between market concentration and the severity
of market disruption given the distress of a major
market supplier. A good example is the market for
original-issue, below-investment-grade (junk)
bonds and the role played in it by Drexel Burnham
Lambert. At the peak of the firm’s market
dominance in the mid-1980s, Drexel’s market share
oscillated around 50 percent, with a dollar value of
issues up to ten times that of the second largest
competitor (Altman and Nammacher 1987). As a
result of well-known events, Drexel filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in February
1990. Drexel’s exit significantly disrupted the junk-
bond market. Return spreads over Treasury
securities increased from an average of 400 basis
points during the 1980s to 1,000 basis points after
Drexel’s exit. Issuance also shrank substantially.
The annual value of new issues declined from
about $30 billion before Drexel’s exit to about $4
billion in 1990, and it took three years to return to
pre-exit volumes (Edwards and Mishkin 1995).
Moreover, negative repercussions were also felt in
other industries, as large junk-bond holders
attempted to find suitable substitutes for the
services Drexel had provided.2 Theory, however,
has focused almost exclusively on the link between
market concentration and the probability of a firm’s
distress, offering mixed conclusions about the
link’s direction. Some of the literature suggests a
negative link between market concentration and the
probability of firm distress. This literature focuses
on how market concentration affects firms’
incentives to take risk, a concept with direct
correspondence to the probability of a firm’s
distress. Keeley (1990) as well as Hellmann,
Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) argue that banks in
concentrated markets have incentives to reduce
risk. If higher concentration reflects decreased
competition and increased profitability, then banks’
franchise values will be higher. Higher franchise
values reduce the incentives of equity holders to
engage in excessive risk-taking behavior that might
jeopardize their franchise.
Chart
Share of Total Bank Assets Held by Top Four U.S.
Commercial Banks
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council Reports of Condition and Income.
III. Concentration Trends
We now examine trends in concentration across a
selection of major U.S. financial markets over the
past fifteen years. The basic question is whether the
regulatory changes of the 1990s have led to a broad
pattern of high and increasing concentration in U.S.
financial markets. It is already well known that
bank concentration at the aggregate level
(measured by the market share of the four largest
U.S. banks) has climbed steadily since the early
1990s (Chart 2), rising from less than 10 percent of
banking industry assets in 1990 to 25 percent at the
end of 2004. Our review shows that high and rising
concentration is not universal across individual
financial markets. We find generally moderate
levels of concentration in wholesale credit and
capital market activities and in most OTC
derivatives markets, plus a mixed pattern in terms
of trend, with concentration rising in some markets
and falling in others. The most noticeable exception
is the prime brokerage market, where concentration
is high (but declining).
Our review covers major U.S. wholesale credit and
capital markets. Admittedly, these markets are not
exhaustive; however, they do represent some of the
most important markets for core wholesale
financial and banking services.8 We measure
market concentration by the standard n-firm
concentration ratio, calculated as the sum of the
market shares of the top n (two, three, or five) firms
in the market, or by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index, the sum of squared market shares of all
firms in the market.9 The HHI ranges from zero for
a market with an infinite number of equally sized
(very small) competitors to 10,000 for a market
with a single competitor with a 100 percent market
share. Guidelines published by the U.S.
Department of Justice used in antitrust analysis
specify that markets with HHIs of between 1,000
and 1,800 are considered “moderately
concentrated,” while markets with HHIs greater
than 1,800 are considered “highly concentrated.”
Although the application is not direct, these figures
are useful for interpreting the HHI figures we
discuss.
IV. Market Interdependencies
Thus far, our discussion has centered on the
analysis of single markets. However, the
probability of distress for a firm and the severity of
market disruption may also be affected by
interdependencies across markets. The emergence
of large financial superstores in the late 1990s
suggests that financial markets may now be more
interrelated. In this section, we examine a variety of
evidence on cross-market linkages, finding that
these linkages have increased, especially since the
late 1990s. This increase has been driven mainly by
a growing common set of second-tier firms, rather
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than by increases in the number of firms with top-
five market shares in multiple markets.
Sources: Securities Data Corporation; Loan Pricing
Corporation.
Note: HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
Is an increase in cross-market linkages a concern
for overall stability? On the one hand, the ability of
financial firms to operate simultaneously in several
product markets should open up better
diversification opportunities, reducing risk and thus
the probability of firm distress. On the other hand,
the diversification benefits may be spent by
undertaking riskier investment strategies, making
the overall effect on risk unclear.
Moreover, as financial markets become
increasingly dominated by the same set of financial
firms, these firms may also become more and more
alike, thus actually increasing the risk of exposure
to common aggregate shocks. Risk may also be
enhanced when the same firms are big providers in
multiple markets because alternate suppliers are
needed in many places at once. This multi-market
presence might potentially strain alternate
suppliers, especially if they themselves are
operating in the same multiple markets. On net,
firms that are active in multiple markets may be
more diversified, but the financial system on the
whole may be more vulnerable to firm-specific
shocks.20
We look at cross-market linkages through two
lenses. First, we examine trends in market share
correlations—that is, are banks’ shares in one
market now more or less correlated with their
shares in other markets? Second, we examine the
extent to which individual firms have high shares
across multiple markets and how those shares have
changed.
V. Prompt Substitution Minimizes Disruptions
Our review of trends in financial market structure
yields two main findings. First, while high and
rising concentration is not universal, some markets
are indeed highly concentrated or increasingly so.
Second, financial markets are becoming more
interdependent, and the same set of large
institutions is increasingly likely to occupy top
rankings in several markets. The stability
implications of higher concentration in some
markets and increasing interdependence are two-
sided. If the firms that dominate a concentrated
market or that are spreading across markets are
more diversified, then the probability of a given
firm’s failure should be lower accordingly. In such
an event, however, disruptions may be more severe,
because the exit of a dominant firm in a
concentrated market leaves a bigger hole in that
market and in any others where that firm was top-
ranked.
Whether the failure of a leading financial provider
will disrupt the entire market for a given product
depends crucially on how quickly users can switch
to other providers or products.
If clients of the departed leader can readily switch
to secondary providers at little extra cost, or if they
can substitute a related service, the resulting
disruption will be accordingly small. If switching is
slow or costly, then disruptions will be more
severe. This section discusses financial product
characteristics that tend to speed or slow
substitution. We also compare financial markets by
two simple indicators of potential substitution: the
number of active providers and the turnover in
providers’ relative rankings. Lastly, we array
markets by those indicators and by the level of
concentration. Markets with low turnover,
indicating less potential for substitution among
providers, and high concentration may be more
susceptible to severe market upheaval in the event
of failure by a leading firm than would those
markets characterized by high concentration alone.
Considering both characteristics together thus may
provide more insight than examining concentration
in isolation.
Market Concentration and Turnover
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VI. Conclusion
Our review of the literature shows that,
theoretically, higher concentration may either
increase or decrease the probability of a firm
leaving the market as a result of distress. However,
anecdotal evidence, and common sense, indicates
that the market disruption generated by such an
event would be more severe in concentrated
markets. Hence, even if concentration were to
reduce firms’ incentives to take risk and thus the
potential for distress, public oversight would still
be justified.
We find that market concentration has not followed
a universal upward trend: concentration has
increased in some markets and fallen in others.
Markets have become more interdependent, it
seems, as the same small set of financial firms has
become more dominant across multiple markets.
We argue that the risk or severity of financial
instability depends not just on concentration, but
also on whether other firms can promptly substitute
for an exiting firm. By examining the
concentration-substitution dimension, we are able
to identify potentially problematic areas where the
exit of a large player might exacerbate financial
instability.
What does our analysis say about the role of
policymakers? If the severity of disruptions is
limited by the availability of ready substitutes, what
can or should policymakers do to enhance
substitution? The answer depends on those factors
that limit substitution in the first place. If close
relationships are the limiting factor, laissez-faire
may be optimal. Financial relationships are
delicate, dynamic, and sometimes implicit contracts
that are probably hard to improve from the top
down. However, if the drag on substitution is
customized products, policymakers might help in
efforts to standardize. Standardization is a public
good or externality, so public officials are right to
lead efforts in that direction.1 The recent initiative
to remove the backlog of uncleared derivatives
transactions and to hasten future clearing appears to
be a good step. Policymakers may also have a say
when the friction that limits substitution is some
technological barrier; if privileged access to a key
trading or pricing platform entrenches dominant
providers and limits the choices of users,
policymakers clearly have a legitimate interest to
ensure both stability and competition. Clearing
appears to be a good step. Policymakers may also
have a say when the friction that limits substitution
is some technological barrier; if privileged access
to a key trading or pricing platform entrenches
dominant providers and limits the choices of users,
policymakers clearly have a legitimate interest to
ensure both stability and competition.
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